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COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS IN AMERICAN
LAW.*
1. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE LABOR
AGREEMENTS.
Robert Franklin Hoxie, in his notable book on Trade
Unionism in the United States' remarks: "Among the
main fundamental forces and conditions that determine what
ought to and can be done in the solution of labor problems,
we find that the present legal status determines most largely
the actual conditions and problems of labor, and that most
labor problems must be solved in terms of rights and law by
invoking present rights and law." If this be true, as it un-
doubtedly is, it is small cause for wonder that American
trade unionism is losing much of its earlier contempt for
political action and for the courts as adjudicators of its
disputes with employers. Even the casual newspaper reader
must have noticed in the years since the war the increasing
extent to which labor disputes in court have been fought
tenaciously, with the unions not always on the defensive.
It is significant in this connection that there is, in the
words of one observer,2 "an apparently growing readiness of
the parties to .... [collective labor] agreements to ask for
adjudications under them from the courts"; for it is collec-
*By Ralph F. Fuchs.
1. D. Appleton & Co., 1917, p. 211.
2. Lindley D. Clark in 14 Monthly Labor Review, 818 (April, 1922).
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tive labor agreements which are the objective of all collective
bargaining and which, once signed, become the law of the
parties to them. The attitude which the courts take toward
such agreements will determine the relation between our
common and statutory law on the one hand and the law of
the parties to trade and industry on the other hand, just as
the standing in court of the orders of administrative boards
and commissions determines their place in the modern scheme
of control.
In view of this strategic importance of collective labor
agreements it is somewhat surprising to discover that their
legal nature has never been carefully considered or precisely
defined in an American court decision. There have been
various dicta uttered upon the subject and there are numer-
ous decisions which enforce or refuse to enforce specific
clauses of collective labor agreements; but there has not been
discovered any comprehensive examination into the nature
of such agreements taken as a whole.
A sufficient explanation of the absence of legislative or
judicial definition of the position in law of collective labor
agreements is the inherent difficulty of the matter. Fre-
quently there are multitudinous parties to such agreements,
whose representation in the negotiations leading up to them
raises complicated questions of agency, and who create
decided obstacles to enforcement at law or in equity. There
are unincorporated labor unions and employers' associations
involved, whose standing in court has only recently been
somewhat clarified. Finally, each of the numerous parties
nay or may not be held to be subject to all or a few of a
host of rights, privileges, powers, immunities, duties, liabili-
ties, and disabilities,3 which may or may not be created by
collective labor agreements. The very difficulty of the mat-
3. The classification of jural relations here adopted is the one devel-
oped by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld in his article in 23 Yale Law J. 16, "Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied In Judicial Reasoning," re-
Irinted in a collection of essays bearing the same title. Yale University
Press, 1913.
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ter, however, coupled with its importance, makes it desirable
to attempt to answer the question of whether or not such
agreements are enforcible at law and, if so, to what extent.
In such literature and decisions as exist upon the sub-
ject there are four tendencies discernible upon the subject
of the legal nature of collective labor agreements: (1) the
tendency to look upon such agreements as mere memoranda
of usage; (2) the tendency to view them as moral obliga-
tions; (3' the tendency to regard them as contracts; and (4)
the tendency to recognize in them a unique species of jurid-
ical act. These four tendencies will be taken up in order.
2. COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS AS MENIOEADA OF USAGE.
A collective labor agreement, says the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, in Hudson v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, and Texas
Pacific R. CO., 4 is "not a contract" and "comes squarely with-
in the definition of usage." Wherever that view of the matter
is accepted, the question of the direct enforcement of col-
lective labor agreements cannot arise. A usage, unless
enacted deliberately into a rule of law, cannot be enforced;
and the fact that it may look in some respects like a con-
tract will make no difference so long as it is considered to
be a usage rather than a contract.
A usage may be, however, and frequently is, incorpo-
rated into a separate and distinct agreement which may be
a contract and be enforcible as such. The individual em-
ployment relation gives rise to a true contract; and when the
particular employer and worker who enter into it are di-
rectly or indirectly concerned in a collective labor agreement
it obviously may be true that they intend to incorporate
certain of the terms of the collective agreement into their
individual contract.5 The collective labor agreement will in
4. 152 Ky. 711; 154 S. W. 47 (1913).
5. It has been pointed out by Dean Arthur L. Corbin in an article on
Offer and Acceptance and some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale Law
J. 169 (Jan., 1917), that there Is no such thing as the Individual contract
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
that event remain a mere usage; it will be no more enforcible
by itself as between those concerned in it than it was before;
and certain of its provisions may have no application to the
particular individual contract. The applicable provisions
will, however, be enforcible indirectly as terms of the indi-
vidual contract. Such indirect enforcement has frequently
been given to certain terms of collective labor agreements.
The only question of any difficulty that arises in cases
where collective labor agreements are regarded as memo-
randa of usage is the question of whether under the particu-
lar facts the parties to an individual contract intended to
incorporate into it the terms of a collective agreement. This
question turns upon what constitutes adoption of a usage;
and upon this point in connection with collective labor agree-
ments there is great diversity of judicial opinion.
A liberal case is Gregg v. Starks et al.0 The plaintiff was
a passenger conductor of the Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road. The defendant was a freight conductor who sought
to displace the plaintiff, the question being one of seniority
as between different classes of conductors. The railroad was
joined as a nominal defendant. Despite the fact that the
plaintiff was not a member of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen the decision was based entirely upon the agree-
of employment, in the usual sense of the term, in connection with the
ordinary hiring at will. The parties do not get together and establish
rights in personam against each other which thereafter can be enforced.
Neither of them really agrees In advance to do anything unconditionally.
But as soon as they act in accordance with their understanding by entering
Into the relation of employer and employee, and for as long a period as
they continue In that relation, certain enforcible rights and duties do arise.
These are in part contractual rights and duties because the parties, in
contemplation of law, fixed them In the first place of their own free wills.
Payment of the stipulated wages for work actually performed is mentioned
by Dean Corbin as a contractual duty of the employer towards his em-
ployee, who has the corresponding right In personam to receive the wage.
It Is submitted that there inky be other rights and duties without number,
such as those arising from a promise on the part of the worker not to
join a union during the continuance of the employment. It is such rights
and duties which, according to the view now under discussion, may be
taken over from a collective labor agreement.
6. 188 Ky. $34; 224 S. W. 459 (1920).
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ment between the brotherhood and the company, on the
ground that the terms of the collective labor agreement con-
stituted a usage which the plaintiff and the company obvi-
ously intended should govern their relations and upon which
the former was entitled to rely. Naturally the same thing
was true as to the defendant and the company. The plaintiff
was granted an injunction to protect his right to his run.
In Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co. 7 the court went to the
other extreme, holding that the terms of a collective labor
agreement must be adopted expressly if at all, even as be-
tween a member of a union and an employer who has an
agreement with the union. In that case a coal miner sied
for pay which he had admittedly earned at the time he left
the employ of the defendant company. The company cited
an agreement with the United Mine Workers which entitled
it to hold the amount in litigation until the end of the two-
week pay period following the one in which the plaintiff quit,
and it expressed its willingness to pay at that time. The
decision affirms a judgment for the plaintiff, the court hold-
ing that the miners' union could not contract for the plain-
tiff, that its agreement with the defendant did not constitute
a memorandum of usage which was impliedly incorporated
into the individual contract of employment between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and that in the absence of an
express adoption of the terms of the collective agreement
by the parties to the individual contract the ordinary rules
of law should govern. The ordinary rule of law is that an
employer must pay wages due within a reasonable time after
the termination of an employment; and the plaintiff in the
opinion of the court had permitted a reasonable time to
elapse before bringing suit.
In Langmade v. Olean Brewing Co.8 there were special
circumstances which served to rebut any presumption that
7. 180 Mo. 241; 79 S. W. 136 (1904).
8. 137 App. Div. 355; 121 N. Y. Supp. 388 (1910).
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might have existed in their absence as to the adoption of the
terms of a collective labor agreement as a usage. The plain-
tiff in that case was suing his employer for overtime pay
to which he was entitled under a collective labor agreement
negotiated by the union of which he was a member. The
plaintiff during his employment had made frequent demands
for overtime pay which had each time been refused. The
court ruled that his continuance in employment under such
circumstances demonstrated that his individual contract of
employment, informal as'it was, could not be held to have
had incorporated in it the terms of the collective labor
agreement.
In the case of Hudson v. Ry. Co., supra, the plaintiff, a
locomotive engineer formerly in the defendant's employ,
sued for lost time following his summary discharge for in-
fraction of the company's rules. He based his claim upon
a provision in the collective agreement of his union with the
company, providing for a hearing within ten days for any
engineer who believed himself unjustly discharged. The
plaintiff was refused such a hearing, and his claim was
that the company had violated its contract to his damage.
After defining collective labor agreements as memoranda
of usage, the court went on to state that the particular clause
in question could not be held to have been incorporated
by the plaintiff and the company into the plaintiff's individ-
ual contract of employment, for the reason that his contract
was an ordinary hiring at will, with which a provision for
a hearing would have been inconsistent.
In Mastell v. Sato, the plaintiff, a coal miner, was per-
mitted to recover certain wages from his employers because
the jury found that he was entitled to them under the terms
of his individual contract of employment. The court held
that the jury was correctly charged that the plaintiff could
not recover upon the collective agreement of his union with
9. 140 Ark. 408; .16 S. W. 583 (1919).
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his employer, notwithstanding the fact that the agreement
expressly prohibited individual contracts inconsistent with
its terms. In other words, a collective labor agreement
cannot by its own terms be made anything more binding
than usage upon the individuals concerned in it. They may
incorporate it into their own contracts or not, just as they
see fit, and it derives no force from its own wording. In
the particular case certain terms of the agreement were held
to have been incorporated into the plaintiff's contract.
It is clear that in all of the foregoing cases the collective
labor agreements which were involved were legal nullities.
Of themselves they bound no one. In certain cases, how-
ever, where the facts warranted such a conclusion, they were
vitalized as to certain terms by being expressly or impliedly
incorporated into contracts to which the courts could give
effect. A slight advance from this position toward direct
legal enforcibilit-y of collective labor agreements is made by
the view that such agreements are morally binding upon the
parties to them.
3. COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREETMENTS AS MORALLY BINDING
OBLIGATIONS.
The view that collective labor agreements probably are
binding in morals but are not binding in law is a convenient
refuge for two classes of commentators upon the subject:
those who believe that the courts should stay out of the
field of enforcing such agreements and those who believe that
the complicated nature of the rights and obligations involved
makes it impossible--however desirable it otherwise might
be-for the courts to deal with them effectively. These two
(lasses together constitute by far the larger number of
those who have written upon the subject.
The President's Industrial Conference in 1920, for exam-
ple, reported with reference to collective labor agreements
that "For the present at least enforcement must rest substan-
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tially upon good faith." 10  The same view was taken in
1916 in both major reports of the United States Commission
on Industrial Relations. The report of the Director of Re-
search and Investigation states that "It does not seem, nor
has it been urged by any careful student of the problem,
whether employer or workman, that any good end would be
served by giving legal validity to joint agreements." 11 Simi-
larly the majority of the British Royal Commission on Labor
in 1894 expressed the opinion that "It does not appear that
such collective agreements can be . . . otherwise than
morally binding.' 1 2 Commons and Andrews in their book
on the Principles of Labor Legislation brand the collective
labor agreement as "merely a 'gentleman's agreement,' a
mutual understanding, not enforceable against anybody ....
There is no legal penalty if the individual contract is made
differently. To enforce the collective contract would be to
deny the individual's liberty to make his own contract."' 3
Elsewhere it is stated that "Real collective bargaining ....
requires getting together in a joint conference, and, through
representatives, making a trade agreement binding upon
individuals on both sides."' 4
There are, of course, numerous fields in which the de-
mands of good morals exceed the demands of the law; but
law makes its progress by following in the path of morals,
now lagging far behind, now crowding close upon the heels
of morality, and at times even making a spurt in advance.
Those who express the view that collective labor agreements
are moral obligations, therefore, are unconsciously furnishing
grounds for the law to try its hand at giving legal effect to
them. This is especially true as regards courts of equity,
10. Reprint of the report of the Conference in the Eighth Annual
Report of the Secretary of Labor, p. 256.
11. Final Report and Testimony, v. 1, p. 120.
12. Fifth and Final Report, p. 54.
13. Harper and Brothers, 2nd ed. 1920, p. 118.
14. Ibid, p. 120.
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where there still remain ways to give limited effect to that
vast residuum of "good conscience" which has not been
crystallized into the formal doctrines of equity jurispru-
dence.
In suits for injunctions, for example, courts of equity
must judge of the legality of the acts sought to be enjoined,
which, especially when the acts are done by a combination
of persons, depends upon their purpose. Violations of clear
moral obligations on one side or the other are, naturally,
important evidence of the good or evil intent of the acts
which the courts must enjoin or refuse to enjoin. Accord-
ingly there is authority that, while compliance with collec-
tive labor agreements cannot be enforced and no damages
can be collected for their violation, some acts can be en-
joined wholly or partly because they are or tend to produce
violations. Conversely, an injunction is sometimes refused
because the plaintiff has broken a collective labor agreement
and has thereby justified the acts complained of, or because
the defendant was merely trying to enforce an agreement.
In most of these cases it is difficult to determine whether
the courts regard the collective labor agreements which are
involved as contracts or as mere moral obligations; but there
are cases in which the latter view appears to be taken.
In a group of Massachusetts cases in which a collective
labor agreement was variously given effect and disregarded
there seems to have been a considerable amount of confu-
sion in the mind of the court regarding the precise legal
nature of the agreement. The only conclusion possible is that
the collective labor agreement created certain moral obliga-
tions which, under certain circumstances, the court, as a
court of equity, would take into account, but which under
other circumstances would prove to be not legally binding. In
Tracey et al. v. Osborne et al.,15 a suit for an injunction was
brought by the members and representatives of one shoe
15. 226 Mass. 25; 114 N. E. 959 (1917).
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workers' union against the members and representatives of
another. The plaintiffs were seeking to protect a union-
shop agreement, which they had with certain employers.
against interference by the defendant union, which evidently
had secured the discharge from employment of some of the
plaintiff union's members. The court held that an injunction
should issue, but the langauge of the decision is far from
exact and it is not possible to determine whether the court
sought to protect the collective agreement or the individual
employment "contracts" of the union members. The latter
are mentioned; but the union is referred to as the plaintiff
and the union-shop "contract" is declared to be within the
law. On the whole one gets the impression that it is the
collective agreement which is taken to justify the issuance
of the injunction and that such an agreement is entitled to
the same protection as contracts generally.
In Shinsky Yv. Tracey et al.,16 decided on the same day as
Tracey v. Osborne, the same collective labor agreement is
treated as a nullity. The plaintiff had been a member of the
defendant union at the time that it entered into its union-
shop agreement with the employers, but he had subsequently
been expelled according to the union's rules and the union
had thereafter secured his discharge and prevented his fur-
ther employment. The court, which took persecution of the
plaintiff and making him an example to the union's mem-
bership to be the motives actuating the union, awarded
damages to the plaintiff. The claim that he was bound by
the union-shop agreement was disallowed on the ground that
his individual contract of employment said nothing about
his remaining in the union. The same plaintiff, however,
had less success two years later in a similar action against
the same union. In Shinsky v. O'Neil et al.,17 it was found
that the union was treating the plaintiff no differently from
other non-union men and that it merely was employing
16. 226 Mass. 21; 114 N. E. 957.
17. 232 Mass. 99; 121 N. E. 790 (1919).
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legitimiate means to enforce its union-shop agreement. An
injunction was refused. 8
In Smith v. Bowen et al., 9 decided the same day as
Rhinsky v. O'Nei, the plaintiff sought an injunction against
a shoe workers' union which had struck to enforce his dis-
charge. The plaintiff had been refused membership by the
union and the union claimed that its strike was simply to
enforce a union-shop agreeinent which it had with the em-
ployer. No malice was shown, and the case has all the indi-
cations of a test case. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
concluded in its decision that the agreement relied upon
made no provision for a closed union shop and that none
could be implied from provisions for shop committees and
for visits of a union agent to the shop. Accordingly the
strike was declared to be without justification and the plain-
tiff was held to be entitled to an injunction. The court ex-
pressly stated, however,, that a union-shop provision in the
collective agreement would have justified the strike and
necessitated a decision for the defendants.
In Great Britain, it may be mentioned in passing, the
question of legal enforcement of collective labor agreements
has not come up in the eourts. Since 1871 the Trade Union
Act" has made it virtually impossible for such agreements
ever to be enforced. Section 4 provides that nothing in the
Act shall enable any court to enforce directly or to award
damages for the breach of agreements falling within a num-
ber of classes, among others, "Any agreement between one
trade union and another." In Great Britain the term, trade
union, includes associations of employers as well as of
workmen.
18. The difference between the two Shinsky cases arises largely out
of differences in the facts found by the respective masters in chancery as
to the motives of the union-persecution in the one case and legitimate
enforcement of an agreement in the other. The appellate court probably
had no alternative to deciding each case upon the facts as found; but the
two cases are an interesting example of the effect upon judicial action of
varying interpretations of economic motives.
19. 232 Fass. 106, 121 N. E. 814.
10. 34 & 36 Vict. c. 31.
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Of course, Section 4 of the Trade Union Act, since it
merely rules out a change in the law which the Act might
otherwise have been interpreted to make, would not affect
any agreements which were enforcible before 1871. Accord-
ingly, if collective labor agreements had been enforcible at
coinmon law they might still be. But in Great Britain vir-
tually all trade unions of employers and of workmen have
been held to be in restraint of trade under the common law
and their agreements, consequently, have been unenforcible
for the same reason that other agreements in restraint of
trade cannot be enforced.21
4. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREE-
MENTS VIEWED AS CONTRACTS.
In searching the now well-known "legal -armory" for an
adequate weapon with which to dispose of the problem of
collective labor agreements the American courts, unrestrained
as they are by legislation, are not likely to rest content with
such a toy dagger as the incidental power of courts of
equity to take account of the moral element in certain situa-
tions. They are more likely to seize upon so conspicuous
a battle 'axe as the concept of contract, and will be con-
cerned chiefly with discovering whether it has any struc-
tural flaws or weaknesses which render it inadequate to the
occasion. The entire fitness of the weapon has been asserted
frequently, chiefly by employers or their representatives.
"It is wrong," says Law and Labor, the official organ
of the League for Industrial Rights, "for a man to breach
his contract and thereby destroy the contract right of an-
other. It is wrong for a third person willfully to induce a
21. It would be logically possible for some court to hold that the
Trade Union Act had given validity to agreements between labor unions
and individual employers, which are not mentioned in Section 4. The
suggestion does not seem, however, to have been made. Such an agree.
ment was under consideration in Read v. Friendly Society of Operative
Stone Masons, [1902] 2 K. B. 88, 732.
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man to breach his contract. It is a greater wrong for men
to conspire and through the power of organization to per-
suade or compel one another to break their collective or indi-
vidual agreement." 22  The entire editorial from which this
quotation is taken, not questioning that collective labor
agreements are full-fledged contracts, argues for their pro-
tection at law on the same basis as other contracts. It
thereby sets forth the frequently-expressed opinion of the
League, which has fought and won for employers many of
the most famous American labor cases. 23
The tendency of the courts to make similar assumptions
as to the contract nature of collective labor agreements is
marked. Frequently one strikes a rather ambiguous pas-
sage, which conveys the impression that such agreements
are contracts. Such a section is contained as a dictum in
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Rey-
nrlds v. Davis,2 4 where the court says: "We have excluded
all cases where the employees are under contract to work
for their employer, because it is now settled in this corn-
monwealth at least that competition and similar defenses are
not a justification for inducing rn employee or other person
to commit a breach of contract and thereby interfere with
the business of the employer .... From that it would seem
to follow necessarily that, in case of persons under a contract
to work, a strike or combination not to work, in violation
contract, to secure something not due to them under that
22. V. 5, p. 82 (April, 1923).
23. Arguments and schemes for making collective labor agreements
legally binding are contained in the following: Fifth and Final Report
of the British Royal Commission on Labour (1894), p. 115; Report of the
United States Industrial Commission (1902), v. 19, p. 857; articles by
Julius Henry Cohen and Magnus W. Alexander in Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, v. 90, pp. 47 & 61 (July, 1920).
Secretary of Labor Wilson opposes legal enforcibility for collective labor
agreements, on the ground of unfairness to the workers, in his Eighth
Annual Report, p. 30. Lindley D. Clark of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics favors it because of present unfairness to workers
in an article in the Monthly Labor Review, v. 12, p. 416 (Feb., 1921).
24. 198 Mass. 294; 84 N. E. 457 (1908).
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contract, would be a combination interfering without justifi-
cation with the employer's business.'"
In so far as the mere terms of collective labor agreo-
ments are concerned, it may be asserted that, contrary to a
frequently-expressed view, there is vo good reason why such
agreements cannot be held to be contracts. The real diffi-
culties which arise in connection with such agreements when
it is attenpted to enforce them as contracts, have to do with
the question of whether or not all those who are supposed to
be parties can be held to have become such in a manner
sufficiently akin to the way in which the parties to ordinary
contracts bind themselves. Assuming for the present that
they do and that collective labor agreements might be made
legally binding upon those directly affected by them, it is
worth while to examine the nature of the rights and obliga-
tions which would be created, in order to dispose of the
question of whether they can be regarded as contractual
rights and obligations.
The ordinary collective labor agreement prescribes mini-
mum wages and maximum hours for the workmen affected.
Certain working conditions are also set forth and certain dis-
ciplinary rules laid down. Sometimes the employer agrees
not to hire anyone but union members, and occasionally the
workers agree not to work for anyone but the employers
entering into the agreement. Strikes and lockouts are pro-
hibited by implication if not expressly. Often specific penal-
ties for violations axe provided, and sometimes machinery
for the hearing and adjustment of complaints is set up.
Other frequent provisions might be mentioned. Each of
these sets of provisions implies a bundle of legal rights and
obligations, some of which may be set forth here.
The employers and workers individually still have their
pre-existing privileges of hiring and entering into employ-
ment. These are abridged, however, by duties imposed by
the agreement and applicable to the individual parties, not
to hire union members or to work for the employers upon
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terms which ran counter to those in the agreement The
workerA, once they accept employment under the agreement.,
have rights to receive the specified wages. The parties, fur-
thermore, are under duties not to violate the working condi-
tions and disciplinary rules, any infraction of which gives
rise to a right of action in the parties adversely affected
and may also give rise to the power to apply the specified
penalties or the privilege of invoking the adjudicatory ma-
chinery. There are duties resting upon all of the parties to
play their assigned parts in carrying on the joint machinery,
as, for instance, where it is incumbent upon the union and
the employers' association to appoint conciliators who shall
hear and adjudge complaints. These conciliators, further,
are given powers over the parties under certain circum-
stances. Where there is a union-shop provision in an agree-
inent the employers are under a duty not to hire anyone
but members of the union. Each of the parties, lastly, has
rights against all of the others that they shall refrain from
obstructing the operation of the agreement by strikes, lock-
outs, and the like.
It is difficult to see any reason why these mutual rights
and obligations should fall short of being enforcible as con-
tractual rights and obligations-still assuming them to b3
adequately agreed to.2 To be sure, the contracts of which
they would be the consequences would not be contracts of
employment; but there is no reason to suppose that actual
contracts of employment" are the only kind of contracts that
25. Certain of the attempted rights and duties might easily be In-
valid for one reazon or another without affecting the validity of collective
labor agreements as a whole. The same thing Is true with regard to other
contracts, such as those involving penalties and those in restraint of
trade. The closed shop has been held to be an Illegal restraint of trade
In Colorado. Campbell et al. v. People, 72 Colo. 213, 210 Pac. 841 (1922).
So with the monopolistic closed shop in New York. McCord v. Thompson-
Starrett Co., 129 App. Div. 130, 113 N. Y. Stpp. 385; aff, 198 N. Y. 587, 92
N. E. 1090 (1910).
26. In the sense outlined in Note 5 or in the case of contracts to
work for definite periods.
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can be concerned with the relation of employer fo empIoyee,
any more than there is reason to suppose that contracts of
sale are the only kind that can be entered into with reference
to the production and exchange of goods. Yet it has been
a frequent practice of the courts to declare that collective
labor agreements are not contracts of employment and there-
fore cannot be contracts at all,27 or else that they are at-
tempted contracts of employment, the enforcement of which
would involve involuntary servitude.
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Schwartz et al. v.
Cigar Makers' International Union et aJ., 28 applied the in-
voluntary servitude argument to the full. The plaintiff had
discharged his union employees in violation of a union-shop
provision in his agreement and had replaced them with non-
union cigar makers. He sought an injunction against the
picketing of his shop, with which the union had retaliated.
The union filed a cross bill, asking for an injunction against
the plaintiff's continuing the manufacture of cigars with
non-union workmen. The opportunity for work with which
they were supplied by the plaintiff's factory was unique, the
workmen claimed. They were entitled to it by contract and
the plaintiff should be prevented from offering it to others,
just as an opera singer who is under contract may be en-
joined from singing for anyone but his employer. The court
could not see the point, however, and took the untenable
position that the injunction asked for against the plaintiff
would have been tantamount to a decree of specific perform-
ance, which may not be granted in connection with con-
tracts of service. It saw no objection, on the other hand, to
issuing the injunction against picketing for which the plain-
tiff had asked.9
27. See the cases cited above, holding that collective labor agree.
ments are mere memoranda of usage.
28. 219 Mich. 589; 189 N. W. 55 (1922).
29. In the earlier -ase of Schwartz et al. v. Wayne Circuit Judge,
217 Mich. 384, 186 N. W. 522 (1922), the court had gone to the length
of ordering the trial judge to enjoin the picketing.
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Most of the doubt as to the application of the principle
which forbids involuntary servitude seems to spring from
misinterpretations of a famous opinion of Judge (later Jus-
tice) Harlan in Arthur et al. v. Oakes et al.30 The opinion
reverses the lower court and removes an injunction against
a threatened strike upon the Northern Pacific Railway upon
the ground that "The rule, we think, is without exception
that equity will not compel the actual, affirmative perform-
ance by an employee of merely personal services, any more
than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal
service one who, no matter for what cause, is not acceptable
to him for services of that character." The language is
carefully limited and states nothing which should prevent
enforcement of any of the usual provisions of collective labor
agreements, as outlined above.
Much more in accord with a sound view of the matter
than the Michigan case just cited is a statement in Lovely et
al. v. Gill et al.31 The court there states: "It may be that
there are provisions which a court of equity in its discretion
would not enforce by specific performance. But the denial
of such relief would not render the entire contract illegal
or voidable." In the opinion just quoted three cases are
decided together. In them the Massachusetts court seems to
have gone over completely to the contract view of collective
labor agreements. The cases arise in connection with a war
between the Boot and Shoe Workers' Union and the Shoe
Workers' Protective Union, and in two of them union-shop
agreements between the first-named union and certain em-
ployers are protected by injunction against interference by
the Shoe Workers' Protective Union on the ground that they
are legal contracts. The injunctions are issued, respectively,
in behalf of the injured union and in behalf of an injured
employer.
30. 63 Fed. 310 (C. C. A., 1894).
31. 245 Mass. 577; 140 N. E. 285 (1923).
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There are a number of other cases in which the courts
have found no difficulty in enforcing specific provisions of
collective labor agreements against individual and collective
parties to them, both at law and in equity. Nederlandsoh
Amerikansche Stoomvart Maatsehappij v. Stevedores' and
Longshoremen's Benevolent Society et al.,82 is an admiralty
case in which the Holland-America Steamship Company re-
covered damages against the defendant union for its breach
of a collective labor agreement entered into by the union
and various ship agents of the port of New Orleans, includ-
ing the agent of the libelant. It was stipulated in the
agreement that in the event of an unauthorized strike of
longshoremen the union would replace the striking workers
with others. Such a strike occurred while one of the libel-
ant's ships was being unloaded, and the defendant union
failed to make any effort to carry out the agreement. The
court treated the agreement as a contract in making its
decision.
In Stone Cleaning and Pointing Union v. Russell,8 3 the
court, while it was somewhat in doubt as to just what a
collective labor agreement is in law, seemed to incline to the
view that it is a contract which is properly vindicated in an
action for damages. The union in that case had a union-
shop agreement with the defendant, and it sought to restrain
him from hiring anyone but its members. The decision de-
clares that the union, "if it has any cause of action, will
have an adequate remedy at law, just as would any other
employee wrongfully discharged."
It is the injunction, however, which has been the favorite
resort of litigants seeking to enforce collective labor agree-
ments. Schlesinger et al. v. Quinto et al.,34 is a leading case
which was given considerable attentionl in the press at the
time it was decided. The defendants were members of an
32. 265 Fed. 397 (1920).
33. 38 Misc. 513; 77 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (1902).
34. 201 App. Div. 487; 194 N. Y. Supp. 401 (1922).
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employers' association in the New York garment industry
and were seeking in combination to reintroduce the piece-
work system into the industry in spite of the fact that an
unexpired agreement with the plaintiff union provided for
weekly wages. The court held that the agreement was a
binding contract and that the inadequacy of damages as
compensation for its violation in the manner alleged and
proved justified the issuance of an injunction forbidding the
violation.
Herman Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co.,35 is a
case which was decided in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and is reported in 4 Law and Labor
220. The plaintiff, a member of a brewery workers' union,
suing in behalf of the union, sought to enjoin a conspiracy
on the part of certain employers to reduce wages in violation
of an existing collective agreement. The court held that the
union as a whole had an interest in seeing that wages were
maintained and that the action was a proper one to bring.
The injunction was awarded. The case is noteworthy be-
cause of the realistic view which the court took of the eco-
nomic situation and of the interests involved.
Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers', Buffers', and Platers'
Local Union No. 44 of Metal Polishers' International Union
et al.," and Burgess et al. v. Ga., Fla., and Ala. R. Co.,37 are
both cases in which strikes were enjoined in suits by em.
ployers because they would have been in violation of col-
lective labor agreements entered into by the defendant unions
In both cases the officers and members of the union were
enjoined from inciting the strike.
In Segenfeld et al. v. Friedman et al.,38 the plaintiff em-
ployer was denied a permanent injunction against the picket-
ing of his embroidery works, partly because he previously
35. 24 N. P. (N. S.) 193 (1922).
36. (N. J. Ch.); 113 AMi. 320 (1919).
37. 148 Ga. 415; 96 S. E. 864 (1918).
38. 117 Misc. 731; 193 N. Y. Supp. 128 (1922).
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had attempted to reduce the wage scale in violation of an
existing agreement with the union. The court regarded the
agreement as a contract and held that the plaintiff had
deprived himself of the "clean hands" which are necessary
to one who seeks the aid of equity. A similar case is Green-
field v. Central Labor Council of Portland et al.39
It is difficult, in view of the foregoing, to believe that
there is anything in the nature of the legal rights anct obli-
gations suggested by collective labor agreements which would
prevent such agreements from being considered to be con-
tracts in the eyes of the law. The rights, duties, privileges,
and the like, which would be created, are definite and on the
whole are capable of legal enforcement. There is, also, suffi-
cient mutuality of benefit and of obligation to satisfy all
requirements of consideration and of equity. But that is
only half the story. One can imagine many valid contracts
of many sorts which might exist but do not: they simply
have not been called into being. So with collective labor
agreements; it may be that the operative acts which would
be necessary to constitute them actual contracts are not, or
else cannot be, performed. This question merits separate
consideration.
5. THE FORMATION OF COLECTIw LABOR AGREEMENTS.
The feature of contract rights and obligations " which
distinguishes them from those arising out of legislation and
out of common-law rules, is the fact that in the eyes of the
law they are created voluntarily by the persons affected.
They would not exisf but for certain affirmative acts of the
contracting parties; and it has been the constant aim of
equity to see to it that no legally-recognized contracts should
be tainted with fraud and duress such as would deprive them
of their voluntary character. If it be true that economic
39. (Ore.), 192 Pac. 783 (1920).
40. Exclusive of rights and obligations arising from implied contracts
and quasi-contracts.
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pressure has not been sufficiently recognized in law as a fac-
tor limiting the voluntary character of certain contracts,
it is also true that this lapse has not been due to any con-
.cious departure by the courts from the traditional end of
keeping contracts genuinely free.
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that subjec-
tion to legal liability for the non-performance of promises
is as much a matter of choice as the making of the promises
themselves. The law has never been particular about inquir-
ing whether the parties to contracts had a judge and jury in
mind when they bound themselves to each other by offer and
acceptance. If people choose to make contracts they will be
held to them at law, even if they had intended to stay out
of court entirely. It is sound public policy that this should
be so in the great majority of instances.
What the courts must decide in connection with collec-
tive labor agreements, accordingly, is whether the parties
affected actually do make promises to each other with a
sufficient degree of freedom and of intention on their part
to justify the law in holding them to their agreements. They
need not, on the other hand, greatly concern themselves with
whether or not the parties enjoy being haled into court
later on-although this is decidedly a proper question for
legislative consideration in dealing with the matter. The
extent to which the parties to collective labor agreements
actually bind themselves must be taken up as it affects two
classes of parties: the organizations on each side and the
individuals on each side; for it has become apparent by this
time that collective labor agreements, if they are contracts
at all, are not simple bilateral contracts but are complex
instruments with distinct rights and obligations attaching
to several sets of parties.
Where the employer-individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, or trust-signs a collective labor agreement directly, no
question of the consent given by that employer can be raised.
If the agreement is a valid contract in other respects, no
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difficulty will be found in holding such a party to his duties
or in enforcing his rights. Many of the cases cited through-
out this article were decided for or against such employers. 41
In the numerous instances, however, in which individual
employers and workers are bound, if at all, only by the
action of employers' associations or labor unions of which
they are members, motty problems of agency and consent
must be solved. Occasionally the problems are even more
difficult, as, for instance, where the individual parties on one
side or the other are not represented by an organization but
simply by delegates chosen more or less informally. In all
such cases the courts must decide whether by the use of
agents or by some process of ratification the individual
parties to the collective labor agreements have attached
specified rights and obligations to themselves as individuals.
Decisions have already been cited which declare that
under no circumstances can a labor union or its officers con-
tract for its members.42 This view of the matter is produced
by the same confusion of thought as that which prevails
with regard to the individual contract of employment. It
has been pointed out above43 that in connection with the
ordinary hiring at will there is no contract of employment at
all until the parties have actually entered into the relation
of employer and employee. Until that time there is no right
or duty on either side. After that time, furthermore, there
is no right or duty extending into the future; for either party
can break off at will. The duties of each party are con-
tingent upon performance by the other party, and perform-
41. See, for instance, Lovely et al. v. Gill et al., Nederlandsch Ameri-
kansche Stoomvart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' and Longshoremen's Benev-
olent Society et al., and Burgess et al. v. Ga., Fla., and Ala. R. Co., supra,
42. See Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., supra. In W. A. Snow Iron
Works, Inc., v. Chadwick et al., 227 Mass. 382, 116 N. E. 801 (1917), the
court said: "The officers of the union could not create by either word or
conduct a .binding bargain in behalf of the members of their union to
furnish labor to be individually performed, unless they had been author-
ized expressly or Impliedly by the members in some form sufficient to
show mutuality of will and consent."
43. See Note 5.
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a-nce by one party, in the absence of a discontinuance of the
employment relation by the other party, gives rise to en-
forcible contract rights. Notwithstanding this contingent
nature of contracts of employment, the courts and commen-
tators have fallen into the habit of looking upon such con-
tracts as something preceding the employment relation and
in some manner tying the parties to each other. It seems
likely that the same misconception may be a strong factor
in causing some courts to be fearful of holding that labor
unions can bind their members. The question, consequently,
has come to be looked upon primarily as a matter of policy
in relation to this sort of contractual rights and duties
rather than as a problem of agency and consent.
But the question in reality does not turn upon the for-
mation of a binding contract to create individual employ-
inent relations. It has to do, instead, with the creation of a
different sort of contract, which cannot control the relation
of the individual employer and worker to each other unless
they enter into that relation of their own wills, and which
can control it only so long as they remain each others'
employer and employee. By becoming employer and em-
ployee they can, if the courts see fit, be held to call into
play the contingent terms of their collective agreement just
as easily as, in the absence of such an agreement, they could
be held to call into force the terms of some pre-existing
understanding of their own. Either they could be held to
conform to the requirements of the collective contract as it
affects their relation, or they could be held to incorporate
into their own contract the usages laid down in the collective
agreement.
Thus far it makes no practical difference whether the
collective agreement be considered to be a contract or a
memorandum of usage. In both cases the terms of the indi-
vidual contract of employment could be held to conform
to it and could be enforced in court to the same extent.
In both cases the terms of the individual employment could,
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if the express stipulation were made, vary from those laid
down in the collective labor agreement; for even if the col-
lective agreement is a contract requiring certain terms, a
contract may be violated. But it may not be violated without
liability to the other parties to it; and, in addition, one
sometimes runs up against an injunction. For this reason
the collective labor agreement would have more force as a
contract than as a memorandum of usage.
The question of the consent of the individual parties to
collective labor agreements, consequently, is not a question
of whether they can be bound to each other as employer and
employee, but a question of whether workers and employers
can and do, by virtue of membership in labor unions and
employers' associations which enter into agreements, author-
ize the limitation of their freedom to contract with each
other as individuals. 44  There is, also, the further question
of whether they can in a similar manner incur certain
duties, such as the duty not to incite strikes or lockouts,
which are independent of the creation of individual employ-
ment relations. In connection with both questions two mat-
ters must be considered: the matter of agency and consent,
and the matter of public policy. It is the former alone which
is under consideration at this point.45
In all of the cases cited above in which a collective labor
agreement was vindicated in damages or protected by an
injunction and in which either the plaintiff or the defendant
was -an individual party who had become such by virtue of
membership in an organization, it was implicit that the indi-
44. Much as one selling a business through an agent may, through
that agent, limit his future freedom to engage in business. But In the case
of the worker and employer, of course, there is no sale to which to attach
the limitation upon freedom.
45. The matter of public policy Is, of course, all-important, Involving,
as it does, the doctrine of restraint of trade, the anti-trust acts, and
constitutional provisions, in addition to far-reaching social considerations.
It cannot, however, be taken up in this article, which is a preliminary
analytical study of the legal nature of collective labor agreements, assum.
ing them to be valid from the standpoint of public policy, as they undoubt-
edly are to a large extent.
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vidual parties had given adequate consent to what was taken
to be a valid collective contract."6 There are occasional cases
in which the question of the consent given by individual par-
ties to collective labor agreements has been taken up explic-
itly and decided favorably to the contract view.
In A. R. Barnes and Co. et al. v. Berry et aZ.,47 the court
considered the nature of the collective labor agreement which
was involved but which, as it turned out, had never been
finally concluded. The opinion is far from satisfactory as a
whole, but it seems to state accurately the relation between
the collective agreement and the individual employment con-
tracts of the printers and their employees. "The provisions
of the [collective] contract," says the court, "upon its being
entered into become terms of the separate contracts of em-
ployment between each member of the Typothetae and the
members of the union in his employ." In other words, the
members of the Typothetae and the members of the union
authorize their organizations to enter into a contract which
shall, in a manner binding them as against the other parties
to the agreement, lay down the terms upon which they
shall, by maintaining their employment relations, contract
as individuals. It is submitted that this view-leaving pub-
lic policy and economic expediency out of account-is fun-
damentally sound. There is nothing impossible about the
legal relations which it postulates and it is substantially
true to the facts and to the understanding of the parties.
It leaves room, furthermore, for the fixing not only of wages,
hours, and thb like, between employer and employee,
but also of the rights and obligations which exist under a
collective contract between each worker or employer and all
thbe rest of the parties, independently of particular contracts
of employment.4 8
46. See Schlesinger et al. v. Quinto et al., Ga., Fla., & Ala. R. Co.,
and Gilchrist Co. v. Local Union 44, supra.
47. 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A., 1909).
48. Such as the rights and duties enforced In Schlesinger et al. T.
Quinto et al. and in Herman Leveranz v. Cleveland Home Brewing Co.,
supra.
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The view just outlined is followed with variations in two
cases in the New York Supreme Court. In Keysaw v. Dot-
terweich Brewing Co.,49 the plaintiff was a workman suing
for overtime pay due him under the terms of a collective labor
agreement. The court held that "It was competent to show
by parol that the defendant recognized the fact that the
plaintiff was working for it under this contract, the parties
thus adopting the contract made in form with the plaintiff's
union." In Gulla v. Barton,0 the court permitted a brewery
worker to recover back pay of $9 a week for 49 weeks.
The plaintiff had been working for a weekly wage of $9,
ignorant of fhe fact that the collective agreement of his
union with his employer entitled him to $18. The union
finally protested and the plaintiff filed suit. In the lan-
guage of the court, "The agreement referred to was a valid
contract which may be enforced in any proper manner ....
The union entered into the contract for the benefit of the
plaintiff and all other employees in the defendant's brewery
and for the benefit of all union workmen."
In Moody v. Model Window Glass Co.,51 the national
agreement between the window glass workers and their em-
ployers was involved. The agreement provided that in the
event workers were induced to come to a plant from other
cities by a promise of employment which subsequently was
not fulfilled they were to be paid either $20 a week for lost
time or all the expenses incurred. Defendants had come
from California to Arkansas in response to a letter which
promised employment. They lost five weeks' time when the
plant to which they came did not open as promised, at the
end of the first two of which they were paid $40. The
company brought suit to recover the $40 and the defendants
filed a counterclaim for $60 to cover the other three weeks
of lost time. Judgment was for the defendants both in the
49. 121 App. Div. 58; 105 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1907).
50. 164 App. Div. 293; 149 N. Y. Supp. 952 (1914).
61. 145 Ark. 197; 224 S. W. 436 (1920).
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original action and upon the counterclaim, the court holding
that the plaintiff and the defendants acted with reference
to the national agreement, the applicable terms of which
should accordingly be enforced.
Even if it be considered as settled, however, that indi-
vidual employers and workers do become parties to collective
labor agreements in a binding manner and that their con-
tractual rights and duties are clearly defined, the problem
of the formation of these contracts is not entirely solved.
The agreements would still be effective only in part unless
the collective parties were also bound and subjected to their
specific rights and duties. Whether these parties axe so
bound is a subject which remains to be considered.
The difficulties in this connection are manifold and are
of so obvious a nature in the present state of the law as to
have caused many writers to believe that they were the only
obstacles in the way of holding collective labor agreements
to be full-fledged contracts. For over a score of years cen-
tering about the year 1900 there was waged a dispute as to
whether or not trade unions and employers' associations
should become incorporated; and the assumption was made
in almost all the arguments on both sides52 that incorporation
would of itself in some manner make collective labor agree-
ments enforcible as contracts.
The anachronisms and anomalies in the legal status of
unincorporated associations, which were sought to be reme-
died by the incorporation proposal, are too numerous and
complicated to be gone into here. Suffice it to say that it is
an open question whether such associations exist at all in
the eyes of the law. For a long time they undoubtedly did
not; they were regarded as mere collections of individuals
indistiguishable from their members; and their names were
but collective pseudonyms for the individuals composing
52. A considerable number of these opinions is collected in The
Incorporation of Unions, by Joseph M. Klamon, a Master's thesis at Yale
University (1924).
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them.-3 All of their rights and duties were reducible to
rights and duties of their members jointly or jointly and
severally. Their creation, consequently, raised all the ques-
tions already taken up in the discussion of the purely indi-
vidual rights and duties of employers and workers under
collective labor agreements; and their enforcement gave rise
to almost insuperable difficulties in connection with the juris-
diction of courts, the parties to be included in actions, and
the apportionment of liabilities and benefits. Equity af-
forded some relief by means of representative actiots, but
this was available only in equity cases and did not affect
the question of the capacity of the unincorporated groups
to enter into agreements in the first plate.
In one way or another, as is apparent from cases already
cited, means have been found in some instances to hold that
labor unions and employers' associations, as entities, did as-
sume contractual rights and duties when they entered into
collective labor agreements, as well as to enforce those rights
and duties in court.5 4  Common-sense notions bear out the
view which is implicit in these cases, however much certain
of them may be at variance with precedent. Labor unions
and employers' associations are distinct entities and are
constantly being dealt with and referred to as such. They
act as entities when they enter into collective labor agree-
ments. In that or any other connection there seems to be no
good reason for holding, simply because of more or less
outworn common-law doctrines, that they cannot assume
enforcible rights and duties. If the legislature, for reasons of
policy, wishes to enact a contrary rule, it can do so, thus
53. The older common law of the matter is well set forth In an ar-
ticle on Ufifhcorp6rated Agsociations as Parties to Actions, by Wesley
A. Sturgis, 23 Ygle Law J. 393 (Feb., 1924). An excellent longer presenta-
tion is contained in Wrightington, Unincorporated Associations, 2nd ed.,
1923; Little, Brown & Co.
54. See LoveIy et al. v. Gill et al., Nederlandsch-Amerikansche Stoom-
vart Mlaatschappij v. Stevedores' and Longshoremen's Benevolent Society
et al, and Schlesinger et al. v. Quinto et al.
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expressly creating an anomaly in the law. Such was the
view taken by the United States Supreme Court in the now
famous iase of United Mine Workers of America v,. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, where it was held by way of dictum
that a labor union is an entity which is suable as such for
damages arising from its violation of the anti-trust act. Thus
it can commit a wrong and be sued for it It would seem
to follow that it can enter into a contract and sue or be sued
upon it,
Thus, in so far as the view of the Coronado case comes
to be adopted by the courts, an important bar to holding that
collective labor agreements are contracts will be lowered.
6. !rnx t.Guz vIEw.
if the foregoing pages have succeeded in their purpose
they have, in addition to showing the diversity of opinion
over the legal problem connected with collective labor agree-
ments, demonstrated that careful analysis leads to the view
that these agreements might well be considered to be coii-
tracts. At each step necessary to this conclusion there is
much reason and some authority in its support, and its con-
scious adoption would lead to a more coherent, logical body
of decisions than that which exists at present. Individual
parties on each side, including business concerns, would be
held to have bound themselves, through their organizations
as agents, to specific rights and duties. Some of these would
simply be restrictive upon the future liberty of these parties
to fix the terms of their employment relations, and the terms
actually fixed thereafter for each individual employment
would be assumed to be in conformity to the agreement.
59. Whether there Is lesidual liability In the members of a union for
damages which cannot be satisfied out of organization funds, is a question
which the Oorofad6 case doeg riot answer. Certainly there ought no be,
In th6 abgetiee of participation in the wrong by the individual member.
So in the case of contracts the individual ought to be held in damages
only for violation of his individual undertaking, as distinguished from the
undertakin& of his organization
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Other rights and duties would attach to the collective parties
on each side; and each party, individual or collective, would
be bound to all the others. With the law thus clarified, both
the courts and the legislature could determine with greater
assurance which of the specific rights and duties should, in
view of sound public policy, be enforced.
It must be admitted, however, that there has been a
touch of unreality about all this discussion. It has been
assumed that the term, collective labor agreement, designates
a kind of arrangement which is essentially the same in all
instances. It has been taken for granted that the parties
in all eases bind each other in much the same way and in
similar words, and that therefore if one collective labor
agreement is a contract virtually all such agreements are
contracts. Needless to say, the assumption is not entirely
true. Collective labor agreements are fax from alike in
phraseology or in the manner of their formation; and the
constitutions of labor unions and employers' associations,
which must constitute the authorization of the organiza-
tions to contract for their individual members, are still more
varied.
The difficulty would be slight if workers and employers,
or their leaders, kept it in mind. They would then be
careful in framing the rules which govern their organiza-
tions and in concluding their agreements to phrase them
exactly, with legal consequences in mind, much as ordinary
business contracts are drawn up. Undoubtedly if such a
policy were pursued collective labor agreements could be
made either as binding contracts or as mere memoranda
with no legal effect at all. But it may be too much to
expect that such intelligence and conscious adaptation to
the law should be displayed, and it may be that the courts
will have to go on trying to interpret and apply poorly-
drawn, inadequate agreements, now finding words which
would make them legally binding and again being forced
to exclude them from the category of contracts. In that
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event it might be well for legislation to shift the basis of
classification from the field of legal analysis to that of eco-
nomic conditions by declaring all collective labor agree-
ments, regardless of form and of legal analogies, to be one
thing or another, with definite, uniform consequences. Other
considerations point to the wisdom of such a course.
"Human interests," says Dean Roscoe Pound, 6 "will
assert themselves continually in new ways, and significant
institutions of every-day life often arise extra-legally and
produce important results independent of or even against
the law. For example, the law of contracts, the law of
master and servant, the law of voluntary associations and
the law of public service have but little relation to the actu-
alities of modern industry, in which the laborer, or rather
a group of laborers, has a vested right in the job not arising
out of contract which is not lost during a strike, in which
the conditions of employment are not fixed by law nor by
the parties to the relation but by union rules, in which the
relation is not individual but collective, in which bargains
are made with and enforced on behalf of de facto entities
that are not legal entities, and in which the obligations of
public service do not apply to groups by which the most
vital public services are in fact performed. Our logical
analysis and logical deductions have failed here and we re-
sort perforce to administrative action."
If we do not resort to administrative action we must at
least resort to new rules and categories to guide judicial
action. In any event we shall probably have to rely upon
legislation to define and deal with the new state of affairs;
and it may be questioned whether judicial legislation will
suffice.
M. Leon Duguit expresses the opinion in connection with
56. "The Administrative Application of Legal Standards," an address
before the section of public utility law of the American Bar Association,
printed in v. 44 of the Reports of the Association, p. 445 (1919).
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collective labor agreements 57 that there should be a recogni-
tion of the fact that such agreements are not contracts but
are juridical acts of a distinct character. They are, he says
in effect, agreements which lay down the law that is to
govern the groups involved and which will so far as pos-
sible, be extended to persons who do not participate ii
framing them. In short, they are unofficial legislative or
administrative expressions; and it becomes, again, a question
of policy how far the state shall recognize them and support
them with sanctions. That policy can be framed with atten-
tion solely to facts and aims, if M. Duguit's view is correct,
and without regard to the legal precedents and analogies
which cluster about the concept of contract.
This view of collective agreements as aggregations of
enacted rules has two large elements of reality, the first of
which is the frequent identity between legislative rules and
the rules laid down in collective labor agreements. In the
words of Commissioners Commons and Harriman of the
United States Industrial Relations Commission of 1913-16,i
"A minimum wage law, for example, may differ in no re-
spect from a joint agreement with a union, except that the
one is enforced by legal penalties or threat of penalties, and
the other by a strike or the threat of a strike." Similar
obvious analogies exist between collective labor agreements
and the decisions of bodies like the Kansas and Australian
courts of industrial relations.
This "rules of the game" view of collective labor agree-
ments finds its other strong support in the fact that the
parties to these agreements almost always desire and fre-
quently attempt to impose them upon other sections of the
same trade or industry, which are not immediately party
to them. The extent to which this shall be permitted is a
subject of bitter controversy,59 but a pretty definite recog-
57. 27 Yale Law Journal 753 (April, 1918).
58. V. 1 of the Report, p. 212.
59. As it was, for instance, in the case of Duplex Printing Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
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nition of the rule-maling character of such agreements is
contained in proposals for their extension by the state in
proper cases. Such a proposal was advanced by the Indus-
trial Council of the British Board of Trade in the report
upon its Inquiry into Industrial Agreements8 0 In Germany
the law provides for the extension of collective labor agree-
ments in proper cases.8 '
On the continent of Europe, especially in France, jurists
have gone much farther in analyzing the legal nature of
collective labor agreements than they have in this country or
in Great Britain, and their work has led to a much greater
quantity of legislation dealing with the subject. An ade-
quate study of the theories and the measures thus evolved
is badly needed to throw light upon the problem in the
United States.62
Whether the solution here is to be found in the adoption
of group-interest theories and in the enactment of legislation
to secure these interests, or whether it is to be found in an
adaptation of individualism and freedom of contract to new
conditions, is not the subject under discussion in this
article. What has been sought is a realization of the fact
that there is an important legal problem in connection with
collective labor agreements and an understanding of the
general nature of that problem.
60. (1913). Reprinted as Bulletin 133 of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Interestingly enough, the Industrial Council, while
favoring the use of governmental power to extend the scope of collective
labor agreements, opposed any use of that power to enforce them as
between the original parties.
61. Reichsgesettsblatt, 1918, p. 1456.
62. French and German th6ught and legislation are briefly treated in
English in two articles in the International Labour Review: The Theory
of Collective Labour Contracts in France, by Gaeton Pirou (v. 5, no. 1, Jan.,
1922), and The Law of Collective Bargaining in Germany, by Fritz Sitzler
(v. 6, no. 4, Oct., 1922).
